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ABSTRACT
Distributed Virtual Private Networks (dVPNs) are new VPN
solutions aiming to solve the trust-privacy concern of a VPN’s
central authority by leveraging a distributed architecture. In
this paper, we first review the existing dVPN ecosystem and
debate on its privacy requirements. Then, we present VPN 0,
a dVPN with strong privacy guarantees and minimal perfor-
mance impact on its users. VPN 0 guarantees that a dVPN
node only carries traffic it has “whitelisted”, without revealing
its whitelist or knowing the traffic it tunnels. This is achieved
via three main innovations. First, an attestation mechanism
which leverages TLS to certify a user visit to a specific do-
main. Second, a zero knowledge proof to certify that some
incoming traffic is authorized, e.g., falls in a node’s whitelist,
without disclosing the target domain. Third, a dynamic chain
of VPN tunnels to both increase privacy and guarantee service
continuation while traffic certification is in place. The paper
demonstratesVPN 0 functioning when integrated with several
production systems, namely BitTorrent DHT and ProtonVPN.
1 INTRODUCTION
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a connection method
used to add privacy to private and public networks, like WiFi
Hotspots or the Internet. Traffic between the user (VPN client)
and a VPN node is encrypted so that network elements along
the path have no access to this traffic. User’s traffic is for-
warded with the IP address of the VPN node, a feature many
VPN providers offer as a remedy to geo-blocking.
Users have to implicitly trust VPN providers not to inter-
fere with or log any of their personal traffic. It is to be noted
that VPN providers are commercial entities that might of-
fer their services relying on other commercial entities (e.g.,
they could use multiple cloud services to obtain a worldwide
footprint [2]). It follows that even trusted and respectable
vendors might unknowingly incur in issues with a specific
provider ranging from surveillance, misconfiguration, and
even hacking. Either of these issues can compromise users’
privacy. In [26] the authors actively investigate 62 commer-
cial VPN providers and find unclear policies for non logging,
some evidence with tampering of their customer traffic, and a
mismatch between advertised VPN node locations and actual
network location.
Driven by the above issues, decentralized Virtual Private
Networks (dVPNs) arose as a fairly new trend with millions
of daily users (e.g., Hola [1]). In a dVPN, users are both VPN
client and relay node as in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network. In
spite of the apparent advantages on their privacy, users of
dVPNs may need to tunnel through their devices traffic that
can be considered harmful or illegal. Indeed, there have been
incidents reported [6, 28], where unaware dVPN users have
been (ab)used as exit nodes through which DDoS attacks
were performed. Similarly, the users have no guarantee on
whether a dVPN might inspect, log, and share any of their
traffic.
In this paper, we first investigate the dVPN ecosystem and
derive a set of requirements from a privacy/performance stand-
point. Next, we propose VPN 0, to the best of our knowledge
the first privacy-preserving dVPN with traffic accounting and
traffic blaming capabilities. VPN 0 is founded on the idea that
dVPN nodes should be able to decide which traffic they want
to carry, e.g., only news websites. At the same time, they
should accept such safe traffic in zero knowledge, i.e., without
being able to tell what this traffic contains. Ultimately, we
aim to offer the above features with minimum impact on the
user experience.
We first note that such strong privacy guarantees are only
possible in conjunction with already private traffic, i.e., TLS
v1.3 [33] and DNScrypt [11]. VPN 0 further leverages a Dis-
tributed Hash Table (DHT) to pair dVPN clients with nodes
currently available to serve their traffic. This pairing is real-
ized using privacy preserving announce and lookup primitives.
Most notably, we introduce VPN chains which help both in
preserving a user privacy and allowing uninterrupted VPN
service. Last but not least, we introduce a zero knowledge
traffic attestation mechanism piggybacking on TLS.
We have integrated VPN 0— to the extent that is possible
without third party cooperation — with BitTorrent DHT [40]
and ProtonVPN [32], a popular VPN provider. We demon-
strate the feasibility of VPN 0 while directing testing to a
public domain supporting TLS v1.3. We also benchmark
VPN 0 performance with respect to DHT lookup, VPN tunnel
setup, and zero knowledge proof calculation. We identify the
current bottleneck in the proof calculation, which makes our
main avenue of future work.
2 MOTIVATION
VPN services enable users to bypass geo-blocking and en-
hance their privacy against snooping ISPs and malicious ac-
cess points. To avoid the necessity of blindly trusting a cen-
tralized service provider that could harm their privacy (e.g.,,
by logging their network connections), dVPNs came to the
rescue. DVPNs are P2P VPNs where users forward their
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traffic through other users and vice-versa. Unfortunately, this
architecture allows malicious users to abuse the network and
perform malicious transactions via unaware users positioned
as exit nodes.
We assume malicious dVPN users, hidden behind benign
users’ IPs, abuse the dVPN by (i) accessing illegal content
(e.g., child pornography, darknet markets [12]), or (ii) launch-
ing distributed attacks against selected targets [28]. In addi-
tion, we assume a snooping ISP who logs the network traffic
uploaded by the user’s device. These logs can be used later
for purposes beyond the control of the user (sold to advertis-
ers [25] or handed over to agencies [22]) that may result in
tarnishing the user’s reputation or even falsely accusing them
for illegal transactions.
2.1 Requirement Analysis
In this paper, we envision a dVPN service that will fulfill the
following requirements:
IP Blacklisting: To be usable, a VPN (both centralized and
distributed) needs to publish at least a portion of its vantage
point list. It follows that it is relatively easy for a censorship
entity or a geo-blocking content provider to access such list
and simply blacklist all the vantage points of a VPN. For cen-
tralized VPNs, this is an issue they constantly face and they
can hardly solve. For dVPNs, such blacklisting is harder due
to the dynamic set of users/IPs involved. DVPN nodes are
regular Internet users who frequently change network loca-
tions and connect from behind Network Address Translators
(NATs). In this case, blocking a NATed VPN node implies
blocking the whole subnet with a potentially massive service
disruption.
No-Logging: Privacy is a main service that should be offered
by a VPN. This implies that, at no time, a VPN node should be
able to log user traffic. In [26], authors investigate the usage
policy offered by several commercial VPNs on their website.
They find that when a privacy policy was available (75% of
the cases), very few VPN services explicitly claimed a no-
logs policy. This analysis suggests that VPN providers today
should do a better job in terms of transparency of their actions.
In dVPN, logging is sometimes required to offer, for example,
protection against IP blacklisting: in VPN Gate [29], each
VPN node keeps connection logs (and shares them with a
central repository) to inform other VPN servers of a potential
censorship authority attempting to discover (and block) the
current dVPN footprint.
Traffic Accounting: The founding idea of a dVPN is that
users share their resources, so there must be a system to ac-
count for such traffic and grant tokens accordingly. Crypto
dVPNs [34, 38] tackle this issue by leveraging the blockchain
to keep track of proof of traffic. This can be challenging de-
pending on which network logging level is allowed/required.
Traffic Blame: From a networking perspective, VPN nodes
are the entity originating the traffic they carry. This means
that serious offenses (e.g., child pornography, hate speech,
drug smuggling), when investigated, will point the authorities
to the entity running the VPN service. At this point, the above
no-logs policy comes into play where the VPN might (or not)
offer extra information about who was indeed originating
such traffic. In a dVPN context, there is no legal entity the
authority can reach to. Instead, they would reach a victim
dVPN user whose network was used to carry such traffic. It
is thus paramount that a dVPN implements a mechanism to
avoid this kind of situation. At the same time, this should
be achieved in a privacy preserving way, thus respecting the
above no logging requirement.
High Quality of Experience (QoE) Offering high QoE is
a hard task for dVPNs. This is because of client churn and
heterogeneous network conditions; this problem is not spe-
cific to dVPNs but an overall generic issue in distributed
systems. A VPN footprint, i.e., how many unique locations
a VPN can offer, is another important QoE metric. VPN
providers constantly battle to offer more vantage points, either
by deploying new physical nodes or by introducing “virtual
locations” based on the information available from geo-IP
databases about the physical locations of their vantage points.
One shared limitation among centralized VPNs is the lack
of residential IP addresses, since they mostly rely on data-
centers to deploy their nodes. Contrary to that, by definition,
dVPNs consist of a large network footprint of residential IP
addresses.
Open Source: A dVPN client/server code is a very critical
piece of software since it can potentially gain access to very
sensitive data. Despite popular VPN tunneling protocols
(OpenVPN and PPTP) are inherently secure, it is important
to note that misconfigurations and/or malicious code are still
potential threats [20].
3 VPN-ZERO: SYSTEM OVERVIEW
This section presents the design of VPN 0, a privacy preserv-
ing dVPN based on zero knowledge. A zero knowledge proof
is a cryptographic tool that allows a prover to prove to a ver-
ifier that a certain statement is true, without disclosing any
information except the fact that the statement validates. In
our case, a dVPN user wants to prove to a dVPN node that the
traffic it is sending is contained within the node’s whitelist,
e.g., a set of domains the node is willing to carry traffic for.
Several challenges are involved to realize the above state-
ment in a decentralized system. First, how to distribute such
whitelists in a privacy preserving manner. Second, how to
build a zero knowledge proof around traffic, and implicitly
which traffic is suitable for such proof. Last but not least, how
to perform the above operations without completely disrupt-
ing the user experience.
In the remainder of this section, we first set the stage for
the traffic type VPN 0 can operate on to guarantee strong
privacy requirements. Next, we introduce the cryptographic
primitives at the foundation of VPN 0. We then describe its
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distributed architecture along with the protocol orchestrating
VPN 0’s operations. Finally, we finish the section with a
description of how we construct the zero knowledge proof.
3.1 Foundations
Confidential Traffic: VPN 0’s zero knowledge goal trans-
lates into strict privacy requirements for the traffic being
carried. To this end, VPN 0 can only be coupled with TLS
v1.3 [33] and DNScrypt [11]. This implies a dVPN node
can only observe a destination IP address, along with TLS
ClientHello and ServerHello messages. These building blocks
allow VPN 0’s users to carry traffic without identifying the
target domain, contrarily to TLS v1.2 [37] where the server
domain name is sent in the clear during the handshake.
Further, even TLS v1.3 does not imply mandatory encryp-
tion of the Server Name Indication (SNI) field in the Clien-
tHello. This would allow a dVPN node to learn which do-
mains a user is visiting. To prevent such privacy leak, the
Encrypted Server Name Indication RFC draft [14] proposes
a novel method to encrypt such information with the public
key of the receiving server. In [14] details are given of how to
encrypt the SNI, and how the receiver of the TLS handshake
only proceeds if such an encryption is performed with the
correct public key.
With respect to the destination IP, while this also can be
used to learn important information about the traffic, we here
assume that orthogonal solutions, e.g., onion routing as in
ToR [21], can be adopted. Nonetheless IP addresses often do
not disclose information about the destination, because the
servers are hosted in within cloud providers or sit behind a
CDN.
Cryptographic Primitives: VPN 0 requires each of the nodes
to own a public-private key-pair (pk, sk). We denote the sig-
nature on message m with private key sk by Sign(m, sk).
Verify(s,pk) verifies a signature s with public key pk. If the
signature is valid, it outputs >. Finally we denote the en-
cryption of message m and decryption of ciphertext C with
Enc(m,pk), Dec(C, sk) respectively.
Moreover, VPN 0 relies on ephemeral one time key-pairs
which are used each time a client lookup a dVPN node. We
use ElGamal key-pair [13], which results in a small overhead
for the user (one exponentiation over a finite field for each
new key calculation once public parameters are computed
for the whole network). We use ephemeral keys so that con-
nection requests cannot be linked to a particular user. We
use ElGamal to denote the operations performed with the
ElGamal keypair (pkEG , skEG ).
3.2 Network Architecture
VPN 0’s architecture is built on top of a Distributed Hash
Table (DHT) [24, 41]. The DHT is used to privately identify
a set of dVPN nodes willing to act as VPN endpoints for some
specific traffic. To this end, dVPN nodes store in the DHT
each entry of their whitelists using the hash of the domain
Figure 1: Flow of a connection using VPN 0. First, nodes
announce their whitelists. Then, when a user wants to
connect to a domain, it first uses a temporary VPN, and
then performs a lookup to find the node to create an au-
thorized VPN with.
name as a key, and as a value the domain’s public key and
their current public IP.
Figure 1 shows an example (magenta dashed line) where
node A announces that it accepts traffic towards a destination
D1. The hashing uniform distribution property enforces that
a whitelist is effectively scattered among multiple peers. This
is important since whitelists contain privacy sensitive infor-
mation. Nodes frequently re-publish their whitelist to account
for fresh information and to update reachability information,
as commonly done in any DHT [24, 41]. A classic time-to-
live approach should be used to handle deletion of entries
from the DHT.
When a user S wants to start a VPN session, it first opens
a temporary VPN tunnel to some node X (Figure 1, green
dashed line). This can be, for instance, a recently used node.
Next, S naturally originates some TLS (v1.3) traffic, e.g., a
visit to a secure domain D1. This temporarily unauthorized
traffic flows through X for a duration T . Within T , X will be
able to locate a dVPN node for which this traffic is authorized,
if it exists.
Meanwhile, S performs a DHT lookup using h1 = h(D1).
We assume an iterative lookup where each step routes the
request to a node whose DHT identifier is closer (bitwise) to
h1 (Figure 1, blue dashed line). Differently from a regular
DHT lookup, S does not include its IP address to the request
but rather X ’s IP so that the destination does not learn which
domain S wants to visit. Note that X cannot perform the DHT
lookup directly since this would imply knowing D1. Addition-
ally, S appends its ephemeral public key pkEG to the lookup.
The later converges to a node R which returns to X the IP
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address of a dVPN node, A, accepting traffic to D1 1. Addi-
tionally, node R includes in the message to X an encryption of
the domain’s public key, CpkD = ElGamal.Enc(pkD ,pkEGS ),
together with a signature of the latter, sR = Sign(CpkD , skR )
and its own public key pkR . Finally R connects with A to
send pkR , which allows A to verify that the accessed domain
is among its accepted domains.
Next, X shares A’s IP, together with CpkD , sR and pkR with
S . Meanwhile, X opens a temporary VPN tunnel to A, the
node selected to carry authorized traffic to D1. When the
tunnel is ready, X creates simple iptables rules to connect
the two VPN tunnels, effectively realizing a VPN chain (S →
X → A).
The above VPN chain has an important effect on the ex-
isting TLS connection (S → D). From D’s perspective, the
endpoint was a socket at X (IPX : PORT ). Now, a new socket
(IPA : PORT ) is introduced. This is similar to TCP hijack-
ing [19]; however, in this case we purposely do not attempt
to hijack a TCP connection. The server will thus realize, e.g.,
wrong sequence number, and respond with a TCP RST. This
will travel back to S forcing a new TCP handshake and thus
TLS handshake.
The latter detail is very important since it implies that A
will observe a new TLS handshake. This allows S to compute
a ZKP which convinces A that the destination domain is the
same which was encrypted by R in CpkD . A potential avenue
of attack here is a collusion between S and R. This translates
into a sybil attack, a popular attack on the DHT for which
many countermeasures exist [9]. If the ZKP verification fails,
the tunnel is interrupted. Otherwise, this traffic is authorized
without A ever learning the domain’s SNI or its public key.
3.3 Zero Knowledge Proof
During the forced re-negotiation of the TLS handshake, S
sends again in the ClientHello an encryption of the SNI un-
der the domain’s public key CSN I = Enc(SNI ,pkD ). This,
together with the information received from X : CpkD , sR and
pkR are the key components of the ZKP used in VPN 0.
In a nutshell, the user proves that the key used to encrypt
CSN I is the same than the one encrypted in CpkD , and that
Verify(CpkD ,pkR ) validates. We adopt the Camenisch-Stadler
notation [8] to denote such proofs and write
Π = SPK{(pkD , SNI , skEGS ) :
CSN I = Enc(SNI ,pkD ) ∧
ElGamal.Dec(CpkD , skEGS ) = pkD ∧
Verify(sR ,pkR ) = >}
to denote the non-interactive signature proof of knowledge
that the prover knows the public key pkD used to encrypt SNI
in CSN I , and encrypted in CpkD , where the latter is signed
by pkR . The values between the parenthesis are kept private
1Multiple selection strategies can and should be investigated as a future work.
Figure 2: High level overview of VPN 0’s prototype.
(pkD , SNI , sk
EG
S ), while the other values used in Π are public.
Note that such a proof is not straightforward. We firstly
prove that a ciphertext, CSN I , is the result of an encryption
without disclosing the public key nor the plaintext. This
causes the highest overhead in our construction. We use
the construction presented in [7] for this purpose. Then we
need to link the public key encrypted in clause two, with
the one used in clause one. For this we use a proof that two
commitments hide the same secret [5]. Finally the third clause
can be openly computed by A given that it received the public
key from R.
Using this, S can convince A that the tunnel created is to
a domain that the latter considers valid, without disclosing
which one.
4 PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
This section preliminary evaluates VPN 0. Apart from the
zero knowledge calculation, VPN 0 consists of well known
components for which large scale production systems already
exist. Instead of building a small scale testbed or some form
of emulator/simulator, we have integrated VPN 0— to the
extent that is possible without third party cooperation — with
Mainline [40] (Bittorent DHT based on Kademlia with tens
of millions of users), and ProtonVPN [32], a popular VPN
provider. We further use OpenVPN [30] to run the first VPN
path on a Rasberry Pi we control.
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of our setup.
Please note that we kept the node labeling from Figure 1 as
a direct reference. The figure is further enhanced with wire-
shark data from the ongoing traffic captured at S. A headless
browser [16] runs on a laptop (node A) and it is instrumented
to visit a TLSv1.3-enabled website. For this test we used
facebook.com (31.13.71.36), as shown in the bottom
of the figure).
The laptop connection is tunneled through a Raspberry Pi
(node X) located in the same LAN as S; note that this is a
worst case scenario for VPN 0 since the extra network latency
would further hide our traffic verification process. When-
ever a new visit is started, node X performs a DHT query in
4
Figure 3: CDF of lookup duration ; ProtonVPN and
Mainline DHT.
Mainline. Note that in VPN 0 design this operation is accom-
plished by A while spoofing X’s IP address. Since this would
require a modification of transmission [39], the BitTor-
rent Linux client we instrumented for our tests, we opted
for a simplification which does not impact the performance
evaluation. As input for the DHT lookups, we use the top 100
magnet links (DHT hashes) as indicated by ThePirateBay [3].
As soon as the DHT response is received, our script opens a
new tunnel to a random ProtonVPN server (node A) from the
list provided with a basic subscription. Meanwhile, the ZKP
is calculated at S to be then sent to A for tunnel validation.
This latter step was not implemented since it would require
collaboration with ProtonVPN.
Figure 3 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
of DHT lookup duration in the Mainline DHT for its top 100
hashes. Overall, we observe a uniform distribution between
1 and 20 seconds. Contributions to this delay are: diverse
network paths taken by DHT lookups, failures along the path,
lookup replication factor, etc. It is worth noting that a sim-
ilar result was measured for Mainline in [40], and [36] for
KAD, the DHT used by eMule [15]. Further, lookup optimiza-
tions are possible to speedup these operations, e.g., Steiner et
al. [36] show how KAD latency can be halved with no extra
load on the DHT.
The next operation post DHT lookup is the setup of the
second leg of the VPN chain. Figure 3 also shows the CDF
of such VPN setup time computed for 72 VPN nodes — 96
nodes were tested but 24 failed, i.e., negotiation did not suc-
ceed within 30 seconds. This high failure rate is potentially
due to a ProtonVPN protection for too frequent switches. The
figure shows a median reconnect time of 4 seconds and worst
case durations of up to 10 seconds.
When putting all together, we estimate that VPN 0 requires
a median setup time of 10 seconds, and a worst time of 25-
30 seconds. We benchmarked our ZKP calculation using a
Python prototype implementation and measured an average
of 10 seconds. This indicates that the ZKP calculation can
potentially be VPN 0 bottleneck, especially since both DHT
lookup and VPN tunnel setup can be optimized, if needed. It
Figure 4: CDF of time spent on URL ; 1M browser ses-
sions.
is thus clear that our main future work consists in optimizing
how the ZKP calculation should be carried to minimize its
duration. Our current directions are both an improvement
of the protocol, and a switch to better performing languages
(Rust, C++).
Note that the above latency is currently hidden to the user
thanks to VPN 0 design. However, the longer our procedure
takes the higher the chance for the user to generate unautho-
rized traffic. To comment on the latter, we have analyzed one
million browsing session from Ciao [10], a Chrome plugin
which helps discovering and using free HTTP(S) proxies on
the Internet. We define a session as the time spent at a specific
URL, either manually entered in the browser or opened by
clicking on a link. This consists of the page load time plus
the actual time the user spends interacting with a page. Note
that Ciao only collects page load time, time on site, and bytes
transferred. Any other private information like IP address or
URL requested are not collected.
Figure 4 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
of the time spent on a URL for the above browsing sessions.
We differentiate between ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ where ‘fast’ does
not account for the PLT which is slower than usual in our
dataset since free proxies are used. We further enhance the
figure with a vertical line showing VPN 0 median verification
time (10 seconds). The figure shows that 20% of the sessions
would change before traffic verification. Note that this is a
worst case analysis since our session definition potentially
implies users remaining at a given domain, e.g., by opening a
new article on a news site.
5 RELATED WORK
Zero Knowledge Proofs: Guillou and Quisquater [18] intro-
duced a ZKP proof to verify RSA signatures, which could
be easily extended to verify RSA encryptions under a certain
key. However, for this construction, the knowledge of the
public key (modulus and exponent) is necessary. To hide such
information, we implemented Camenisch’s ZKP of modular
exponentiation presented in [7]. However, the range proof
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included in this paper is not up to date with current state of
the art range proofs. Peng and Bao’s [31] scheme improves
on previous work, which is the construction we have used for
VPN 0.
Distributed Virtual Private Networks: The idea of a dVPN
is far from novel, with many designs dating now more than 10
years back, i.e., when P2P research was at its peak. To the best
of our knowledge, ELA [4] was one of the first approach to
decentralize a VPN. Several other variations then appear, such
as SocialVPN [23] a system which drives the peer selection
strategy based on social relationships among nodes, or N2N
where users share a common encryption key obtained when
they join. None of this approach provides strong privacy
guarantees as VPN 0. However, we start noticing a trend
towards protecting user identify and traffic, e.g., only routing
it through friends and providing strong online identities.
In 2007, the first dVPN “product” was launched: Hola [1].
Hola is a freemium web and mobile application which at-
tracted, over the years, tens of millions of users/nodes. In
Hola, users agree to either pay a premium per month or offer
part of their upload bandwidth to other Hola users. Several
concerns have been raised about the security of Hola [35] and
there is a lot of criticism about the fact that many free users
are unaware that their bandwidth is sold to premium users
(Luminati [27]) or used for malicious purposes [28].
VPN Gate [29] is a service that aims to achieve blocking
resistance to censorship firewalls such as the Great Firewall
of China. Classic VPNs easily fail at this task because their
limited and static network footprint can be easily blocked
(IP blacklisting). The rationale of VPN Gate is to build a
dVPN atop of volunteer machines, and realize a large set of
dynamic IP addresses. The authors further inject innocent
IP addresses in their public IP lists which makes it harder
to perform large IP blacklist. Additionally, they allow their
VPN nodes to cooperate in order to quickly identify a list of
spies, or computers used by censorship authorities to probe
the volunteer dVPN nodes.
With the recent rise of blockchain, a new form of dVPNs
has surfaced. In such, the rationale is to share a users upload
bandwidth in exchange for some crypto tokens. A popular
such example is Mysterium [38]: an open source dVPN com-
pletely built upon a P2P architecture. An immutable smart
contract running on Ethereum will be used to make sure that
the VPN service is paid adequately. It is currently in alpha
test, and incentives will be available soon. In addition, Sen-
tinel [34] is a larger project of which a dVPN is just one of
the use cases. The main idea here is to use the blockchain
to store a ledger of data transactions with a Proof of Traffic.
According to Sentinel’s Lite Paper [17] the “liability of traffic
at the exit node is also upon the host“.
In Section 2.1, we describe in detail the requirements a
dVPN needs to fulfill. After exploring above the existing real
world implementations, in Table 1, we benchmark the existing
dVPNs implementations with respect to the set requirements
Requirements Research Hola VPN
Gate
Mysterium/
Sentinel
VPN 0
Open Source X X X X X
IP Blacklisting X X X X X
QoS Guarantees X X X X -
No Logging X X X X X
Traffic Account X X X X X
Traffic Blame X X X X X
Table 1: Comparison of VPN 0 versus the existing ap-
proaches with respect to the set requirements.
while also comparing with VPN 0. Note that this benchmark-
ing was derived from the public information available about
existing dVPNs. In the table, we label as research the older
approaches discussed at the beginning of the section: ELA,
N2N, and SocialVPN.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Virtual private networks (VPNs) are widely adopted solutions
to protect user privacy, circumvent censorship, and access
geo-filtered content. This paper has investigated decentral-
ized VPNs (dVPNs), recent VPN solutions where users are
both VPN clients and nodes. Overall, existing dVPN de-
signs fail to provide strong privacy guarantees. Most notably,
the decentralized nature requires strong guarantees on the
traffic a dVPN node carries without violating a user’s pri-
vacy, at any time. To tackle this problem we designed VPN 0,
to the best of our knowledge, the first dVPN with strong
privacy requirements and high performance. VPN 0 is built
around a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) atop of which we de-
signed several privacy preserving mechanisms. Most notably,
a strategy to proof, in zero knowledge, that a dVPN client
is attempting to access a TLS domain. This information is
used by dVPN nodes to only allow through them traffic they
are willing to carry, without violating dVPN users privacy.
We integrated VPN 0 with BitTorrent DHT and ProtonVPN,
and benchmarked its performance. Our preliminary results
show the feasibility of the approach but they also highlight a
need of more research to speed up VPN 0’s zero knowledge
calculations. We believe the strong privacy guarantees offered
byVPN 0 will foster the development of future VPN solutions
and protocols.
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